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The commitments of &ritaiu to defence arrangements in the
Southeast Asian region were built around the AnglO-Malaysian Defence
Agreement, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation and her protectorate
role in Brunei.
It should be borne in mind, that the British decision to
disengage from her military commitments in the region was not an isolated
decision. From a historical perspective it was part of the pattern of
the unscrambling of the British Empire that was se, in motion with the
granting of independence to India in the aftermatlt of the Second World War.
This post-war process in Southeast Asia was retarded by the formation of
the MalaYSian Federation and the ensuing Indonesian opposition. The nett
effect of Indonesian Confrontation was the continuation of British military
commitments under the Anqlo-Malaysian Defence Agreement. Indonesian
military hostilities in her strategy of Confrontation led to a greater
involvement of British forces in the defence of the territorial integrity of
Malaysia.
There have been several estimates of the cost of Indonesian
Confrontation. Replying to a question in the House of Commons on the size
and cost of Britain's military commitments, the Secretary of State for
Defence Dr. Dennis Healey stated that the approximate estimated eltpenditure
in 1966-67, directly atrributable to the forces in the Far East (eac:lucling
Hong Kong) was £235 million.l Of this amount only a small portion was
incurred in the actual fighting itself. In terms of troops and equipment
commited, some 60,000 servicemen, 250 aircraft and So ships of the Royal
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Navy made up the British defence aid component. The maintenance of these
troops and their equipment represented about one-eight of the British
defence budget. In terms of foreign exchange the British military presence
in the region resulted in an outflow of less than E100 million.
of actual military operations was about £5 million a year.2
By the ehd of 1965 and in January and February 1966 the Labour
The cost
Cabinet had begUn to rethihk the scale of Brtiaih's east of Suez
Commitments. 3 The separation of Singapore in September 1965 and the
ending of Indonesian/Malaysian hostilities in June 1966 were considerations
that affected the British reassessment. One serious implication for
British defence policy that arose from the separation of Singapore was
that it meant the removal of the Singapore base complex from the framework
of the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement.
Between the first broad hint of withdrawal and the firm r..
announcement of 1968, Britain's decision was an amalgam of economic
rationality and political choice. In the defence review of 1966, she
enunicated her policy in the follow manner.
We believe it is right that Britain should continue
to maintain a military presence in this area. Its
effectiveness will turn largely on the arrangements we
can make with our Commonwealth partners and other allies
in the coming years. As soon as conditions permit, we
shall make some reductions in the forces which we keep
in the area. We have important nilitary facilities in
l"lalaYliaand Singapore, as have ouz Australian and
New Zealand partners. ThesG we plan to retain for as
long as the Governments of Malaysia and Singapgre agree
that we should do so on acceptable conditions.
The firm announcement of British withdrawal from the Far East
was made by the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson in the House of
Commons on the 16 January 1968. According to this announcement British
forces would be pulled back from the Far East and the Persian Gulf by the
end of 1971 after which Britain would not have any special capability
in the region. Nonetheless, a special capability based in Europe was
to be maintained, which could be deployed overseas if circumstances
warranted it.5
A major development in"between the 1966 announcement and the
January 1968 decision was the recommendation of the defence review
completed in March 1967 that British forces in the Far East should be
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reduced by half during 1970-71 and withdrawn completely in the mid-
seventies. 6 Of the factors influencing this decision, the more important
was econ6mld. Britain was already being plagued by this time with serious
I I
balance of payments prdblems. Cbn1bined with this there wcl.sthe growing
political pressure to seek ~~tshlp in the European Economic Community.
There was also developing within the Labour Party serious doubts about
Britain's capacity to undertake in future military operations on the scale
carried out during Confrontation and the desirability of doing 50.7
The crucial factor accelerating the timetable of withdrawal as
announced in January 1968 was the devaluation of sterling on 18 November
1967, combined with the increasing chorus of the critics of the East of
SUez policy within the Labour backbench ranks.8
Initial reactions from Kuala Lumpur to the first broad
announcements of British withdrawal from the region were a mixture of
disillusionment and disappointment. Until the January 1968 decision that
all British forces would be withdrawn from the region by 1971, the Malaysian
reaction did not include any serious assessment of the implications of
British withdrawal from the Southeast Asian region. The campaign of
Konfrontaa.had revealed to Malaysia her military weakness and it would not
have escaped policy planners in Kuala Lumpur that the viability of Halaysia
as a political unit rested on the British military presence under the terms
of the Anglo-i~alaysian Defence Agreement.
However, until the categorical statement of the military
disengagement of Britain from the region by 1971 was made in January 1968
a number of developments tended to obscure the implications of this decision •
The problems brought to the surface by a British withdrawal were
hypothetical in 1966 since the Angl041alaysian Defence Agreement was up
for review in 1971. Further, 1966 was an unusually active year for the
Malaysian diplomatiC establishment. The end of hostilities with Indonesia
and the efforts directed towards working out a peace agreement with
Jakarta absorbed a great deal of her diplomatic energy. In addition,
wbat was engaging the immediate attention of Kuala Lumpur was the future
pattern of cooperation with the new sovereign state of Singapore. In the
area of defence, Singapore was an important preoccupation. The political
divorce of Singapore brought in its trail a whole host of problems in
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almost every area. At the outset, the new political relationship that was
being evolved between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur was characterised mainly
by an atmosphere of non-cooperation. Under the terms of Article V of the
Separation Agreement certain stipulations were laid out relating to the
defence of both countries. Foremost, it specified that both parties would
enter into a treaty on external defence and mutual assistance. The most
important provision of the Separation Agreement was that the parties would
establish a joint defence council and that each party would undertake not to
enter into any treaty or agreement with a foreign power which may be detrimental
to the independence and defence of the other party.
No bilateral defence arrangement between Singapore and Malaysa
was created and defence cooperation between the two countries was not
~ealised as hoped fot under the terms of the SeparatiOn Agreement.9
IThe JOiht befence Council edtablished shortly after separation
was inoperative within a matter of months. The nub of the problems was
that while the political leadership in both countries realised that the
defence of Malaysia and Singapore was indivisible, there was a variance
in the aesessment of external threats and there was a 'mutual suspicion of
intent'. In addition to defence problems with neighbouring Singapore, the
rapproachment with Indonesia in 1966, saw the expression of a Malaysian
desire to replace British troops in East Malaysia and which was carried out
almost immediately. One explanation for this move must have been the wish
on the part of the Malaysian Government to alter its image as a 'stooge of
neocolonialism I •
The reaction of disillusionment and deep disappointment that
emerged consequent to -the public statement of British military disengage-
ment was in a measure preceded by similar feelings in May 1966 when
Britain refused a Nalaysian request for economic aid. Acrimony was
generated by this refusal. The sore point in this issue was the refusal
of Britain to give grants for defence aid totaling $630 million. This
was to have come out of a sum of M$900 million expected in direct aid,
together with M$l,OOO million in loans. All this economic aid was for
various development projects under the First Malaysia Plan.10 The manner
in which the British answer was conveyed was both abrupt and undiplomatic
and was in the words of one account a "continuing source of irritation in
Kuala Lumpur"ll Explanations of the British response were couched in the
· "
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rather delicate and sometimes irascible political relations permeating the
triangular relationship between Malaysia, Singapore and the United Kingdom.
In spite of the public insistence on the part of Britain that her position
was fundamentally due to economic problems of her own, especially in the
light of her adverse balance of payments position, -the view from Kuala
Lumpur was that she had exercised a pro-Singapore hias in her attitude.
In the ensuing Parliamentary debates in mid-l966 both bitterness
and acrimony were given vent by the strident speeches from members of the
ruling Alliance Party. There was a call for a readjustmerlt in Halaysian
thinking towards Britain. One ministerial comment was to the effect that
I
"JUthough we are disappointed, it is a bleSSing in disguise to have been
refused the aid; it is an eye-opener to use and we must learn to be less
"12and less dependent on other countries. The Straits Times Warned
editorially: "If this is the diplomacy of the new British Government in
its dealings with other Commonwealth countries then she should be prepared
to face further deterioration in her influence in the world. We resent
interference in our internal and foreign policies. "13 Anglo-Halaysian
relations dipped to an all time low. There was a touch of irony in this,
coming as it did at a point when Anglo-Malaysian defence collaboration
was seeing a successful diplomatic resolution of Indonesian-Malaysian
hostilities.
The promised reappraisal of L·lalaysianforeign policy as announced
in the June-July 1966 Parliamentary debates did not materialise immediately.
But close on the heels of this rift in Anglo-Halaysia relation a number of
actions were taken by the Malaysian Government that represented a parting
of ways. These were in the economic front but what is significant about these
actions is that they related to some of the more traditional and realistic
Commonwealth links.
In August 1966 the Malaysian Government removed the preferential
tariff rates Qn a number of imports from the Commonwealth countries such
as beverages, cosmetics, textiles, electronic goods and manufactured items
Such as motor vehicles. This decision was explained as a revenue measure.l4
While it would be difficult to refute the economic motive behind the action
of Kuala Lumpur, it has to be borne in mind that preferential tariff rates
were a SUbstantial Commonwealth link. It is difficult to discount an element
of economic retaliation in this measure on the part of the Malaysidn
- 6 -
Government in the light of the earlier British refusal of aid. But it would
not be valid to stretch this point too far. The dictates of natio~l
interests were beginning to assert themselves over Commonwealth loyalties.
This was only to be expected. In the same way that British econo~ic interests
were perceived to be better taken care of by seeking membership within
the European Economic Community, it was only natural for Halaysia to formulate
her import tariffs to suit her economic advantage. Commomvealth preference
gave British goods a very competitive edge in the ~~laysian market. Now
that that advantage was being eroded, the trade implications for British
imports were crystallising.
Following in the wake of this decision, a major alteration in
the relationship with Britain was wrought by the severance of the
Halaysian dollar with the pound sterling. When the pound sterling was
devalued in November 1967 the Malaysian Government decided to maintain
the parity of the Malaysian dollar at 0.290299 grammes of fine gold. The
view taken by the Malaysian Government was that to fbl10w the pound
sterling and to devalue the Malaysian dol1a~ ~ouid be disadvarltagebUs to
Malaysia's competitive poSition ih world ~arkets and would further re~uit
in a increase itl the teet of livirlg fro~ inc~eased import prices of food-
stuff and other basic ite~~.15 This change in the relationship of the,
dollar with the sterling pound was a fundamental change and the relevance
of this change for the economic relationship of the t.wo countries could not
have escaped Malaysi·an policy p lanne rs .
While these developments took place relating to Halaysia's
peace negotiations with Indonesia, her defence cooperation problems with
Singapore and the British refusal of economic aid preoccupied the the
energy of Kuala Lumpur, there "las much to be desired in the manner end
timing of \<lhitehall's announcement of the relinquishment of her role east
of Suez. Two basic criticiams could be made in this respect. Until the
British Government's decision of withdrawal was made public in the
Supplementary White Paper on Defence published on 18 July 1967, various
Spokesmen for Britain gave assurances that Britain would continue to
maintain an east of Suez military role. Until July 1966 there was no
official evaluation of the possibility of British withdrawal. Lord
Shackleton while on an official visit to the Far East stated that while
there would be cuts in British defence expenditure in Malaysia, the
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bases would be maintained as long as they were wanted, in spite of the
16end of Confrontation. Prime Minister Wilson asserted at a meeting of
the Parliamentary Labour Party in June 1966 that Britain had a duty to
assert its influence east of Suez and the government would not retreat
from its commitments.17 Similar reassurances were given by various other
Labour i-linisters. Speaking to the Australian Institute of International
Affairs in the Australian capital on 29 June. Michael Stweart declared
'we have neither the wish nor the intention to abandon the world east of
Suez.18 In the same vein, Denis Henley, while on his Far East tour stated
that Britain would continue to maintain a military presence in Singapore
and Halaysia as long as she was requested to do so on acceptable conditions.19
Up to July 1966 official British policy was expressed in terms of a reduction
of British forces and the rationalization of defence expenditure.
Against the background of these assurances various pressures
built up that led to the alteration of the British Goverriment's official
position. As already indicated earlier these pressures were both of an
economic and political nature. Already the balahce tlfpa~artts position
was becoming adverse ahd defehce econbmiet we~e beihg sought as a remedial
measure in July 1956, ~~te slgnificarlt was t~~ lObbying from Labour
backbertchets fo~ ~h acceierated withdrawal from east of Suez. At the
Labour Party Conference in October 1966 a resolution was passed in favour
of disengaging from military co~~itments east of Suez and stipulating
withdrawal from Malaysia, Singapore and the Persian Gulf by 1969-70.
Consequently by April 1967 the Cabinet resolved to reduce the forces in
the Far East to about half auring 1970-71 and carry out a complete
withdrawal in the mid-seventies. This resolve was embodied in the July 1967
SUpplementary ~'lhitePaper on Defence. The second and more serious criticism
relates to the fact that after having announced her withdrawal from the
Southeast Asian region and the timetable concerning the phasing out of her
military installations and troops, a major alteration in British plans was
announced. It dealt with the issue of timing. Within a matter of months,
the July 1967 position was abandoned. In its place there was Harold Wilson's
parliamentary statement of 16 January 196H. The time schedule for withdrawal
was shortened and it was to be completed by the end of 1971.
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Needless to say, the initial volte face concerning withdrawal
and the later acceleration in the timetable relating to the phasing out
of the British withdrawal could only have caused uncertainty and confusion
in the perception from Kuala Lumpur. While it cannot have excaped policy
planners in Kuala Lumpur that withdr~wal was in the British stack of cards,
especially in view of the fact that both in Canberra and in Singapore a
strongly held assumption was that the future British military role in the
region would be diminished, this judgement until early 1967 was derived from
the general drift of politics and policies in Britain.
Once Malaysian leaders were faced with the reality of British
military disengagement they had to consider the implications it raised fet
the nation in terms of its security arrangements. Prior to the publication
of the July 1967 Supplementary White Paper on Defence, both Tunku Abdul
Rahman and Tun Abdul Razak in discussions held with Denis Healey in April
1967 expressed their concern that it would not be in the secutity interests
of Malaysia for withdrawal plans to be made pUblic in advance.20 Again
i11JUne and Juiy i967 r.lalaysiaarid sohieother Comrllenwealt.hcount.r Les made
attempts to dissuade the United Kingdom from a publicly anrl~unced and eariy
withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia. When Tunku Abdul Rahman arrived
in July for talks relating to the rundown of British forces, he declared
that British forces in Malaysia should be maintained at pre-Confrontation
levels.21
Reaction to the 1967 withdrawal plans on the part of Halaysia
was centred on three points. First of all, there was concern as to the
future of the Anglo-IvlalaysianDefence Agreement. There was uncertainity
:as to what British intentions were - whether abrogation of the Agreement
was under consideration or whether there would be a continued albeit,
partial obligation to the commitments under the agreenlent. Secondly,
there was a deep anxiety as to whether Britain would maintain a level of
forces sufficient to defend the nation against external aggression. The
Prime Minister, TUnku Abdul Rahman stated in the Dewan Ra'ayat that if
this anxiety could be put to rest then, "•.• we could not raise our
objections to their (Britain) proposal to pullout if this is dictated
by their own economic difficulties.,,22 The third pOint was whether
Britain had in her pullout plans taken account of the implications it
would have on the economic and political stability of the region.23
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In .his discussions with the British Government in July 1967
the Tunku expressed these concerns. He further tried to persuade
Whitehall against a total withdrawal by the suggestion that it was too
early to make such plans.
On the part of Whitehall, ~~. Healey assured the Malaysian Prime
Minister that Britain would observe the AMDA commitments. He further tried
to soothe Kuala Lumpur's security anxieties, which the Tunku had voiced to
him by assuring that substantial naval and air forces would continue to
remain until 1970, including amphibious units, although the British airforce
element would be a smaller one. This diminished air element was to be made
up of a squadron with air defence, ground attack and reconnaissance
Capability, maritime reconnaisance and transport aircraft capable of being
reinforced very quickly. In providing this assurance Mr. Healey qualified
it by stating that plans to meet contingencies would inevitably vary as
the Situation may warrant and that military assistance under the AMDA would
not include internal security matters. In this context it was pointed
out by Mr. Healey that with increased air capability, troop reinforcements
from the United Kingdom could be carried out in a matter of days with the
qualification that the speed of such reinforcements would depend on the
reCeption facilities provided by Malaysia. Additionally, the Tunku was
reassured by the British intention to maintain a military presence in the
region in the form of naval and air elements with perhaps a sea-borne
commando force.24
In summary British assurances to fJIalaysiaon the nature of the
British military presence that would be retained was to the effect that
SUbstantial military forces would be left up to the period 1970-71. Also
by 1971 there was to be sufficiently strong naval, air and amphibious
forces based in Singapore capable of meeting any attack on Singapore and
I1alaysia. As for the continued assistance from the United Kingdom under
the terms of ru·IDA,in addition to the qualifications mentioned earlier,
the Tunku was informed that any such military assistance would be in the
form of naval and air capability. Whitehall's argument in this respect was
that it l' hId f h...would be less expensive for l<laysa.a to ave an orces t an for
Britain to maintain such forces in Malaysia and that it, "••• would not want
to dUplicate what the Malaysian Government could do for itself but to
Complement Malaysian defence capabilities in terms of land force with
- 10 -
sophisticated and expensive naval and air weaponry which Malaysia could
ill afford.,,25 Apparently, the Tunku was given to understand that even
after the planned withdrawal in 1975 the United Kingdom would have
sufficient naval and air elements in the region which could cissist
l'lalaysiaagainst external agg~e~~i- .u. The continued use of Singapore by
elements of the Her Majesty's Royal Navy for refitting and repairs,
together with military exercises that would be staged in Singapore and
I1alaysia would in the Tllnku's words, "••. show British intention to
assist in our defence and that British military presence would constitute
26a credible deterrent against external aggression."- The provision in
the July 1967 White paper that ".•• the precise timing of our eventual
withdrawal will depend on progress made in achieving a new basis for
stability in South East ASia and !rt resolving other problems in the Far
East," seems to have put to rest Malaysian fears of the implications of
the pull-out plans for the political and economic stability of the region.
Very much of the British reassurances seems to have hinged on developments
in the field logistics with reference to military air transport. Denis
Healey in a press conference at the ru~ airbase in Kuala Lumpur stated
in April 1967 that reduction in teeth arms or combat forces would be made
Possible "as the result of new strategic transport aircraft already in
service like the DC 10 and the Belfast, and the medium transport aircraft,
the C 130 or Hercules.,,27
In more precise terms, the Malaysian Prime Minister during his
London talks stressed the need for Britain to continue the retention of
the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve as it was feared that the withdrawal
of ground forces would lead to the disintegration of this strategic
reserve. The Tunk~ proposed that Britain and the other Commonwealth
countries involved confer regarding this issue and offered Kuala Lumpur
as the venue. Additionally, the Tunku insisted that the British
authorities do not pursue their claim for financial compensation for
base installations and military camps vacated by British forces. The
argument employed was that these camps were dilapidated and were being
Used to fight communist insurgents who were a common enemy. On the
issue of the economic consequences of the British pull-out there was a
British offer of substantial financial aid to offset these consequences.
The nature and terms of this aid was deferred for future discussions.
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Originally, the British withdrawal plans were to be executed
along the following time framework. There were three phases. During the
first phase up to April 1968, the British proposed to withdraw about 10,000
men in addition to what they had already withdrawn. In the second phase _
i.e. from 1968 to about 1970-71 Britain intented to reduce her troops to
half its pre-Confruntation level which meant that approximately 30,000
troops would have been pulled out by 1970-71. The third and most
significant phase in relation to Malaysian defencG was the British proposal
to assume for planning purposes that she would have withdrawn her forces
completely from the region by the mid-seventies.28
With the 'accordion-like' compression of the withdrawal plans
following Harold Wilson's January 1968 announcement, the time period
during which Nalaysia could haVe worked out alternative security
arrangements was critically shortened. An element of urgency was now
introduced in her defence planning. The initial Malaysian reaction of
'marked uncertainty' was now intensified. There was a strong conviction
that its own defence capability must quickly be bolstered by new arrange-
ments for defence support. While it was remarked in September 1967 that
what I.lalaysiawanted in the new arrangements for defence support was not
clear as presumably the I4alaysians themselves were in the dark, this
Certainly did not apply in the months that followed -c.heJanuary 1968
announcement of the British withdrawal plans.
Predictably, the British decision was ~elcomed in certain circles
within Malaysia, especially among leftist political parties and a number
of others who had been critical of the foreign policies of Tunku Abdul
Rahman in the past.29 In a similar vein there was pressures for a
reappraisal of the foreign and defence policies of the country both within
Parliament and outside. Of immense significance for the country's future
foreign relations was the emergence of the proposal made by Tun Ismail
for the creation of a neutralised zone in Southeast Asia. Speaking in
his capacity as an Alliance backbencher in the Dewan Ra'ayat, Tun Ismail
suggested that in the view of the British withdrawal, it was opportune
for the neutralisation of Southeast Asia, guaranteed by the big powers.
In this neutralised zone all the countries were to sign treaties of non-
aggression and a declaration of a policy of co-existence. 30 Tun Ismail's
proposal, while referred to by the Prime Minister in a number of speeches
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was not seriously considered. It was considered impractical at that time.
Tun Ismail, however was convinced that the neutralisation of the region
was the long term answer to Malaysia's security anxieties and he felt that
while there was considerable support for his suggestion, this was
ff 1 . d th . 31.o set by the Prime Hinister's coo att~tu e to e suggest~on. Until
the resumption of high political office by Tun Ismail in the aftermate
of the ~lay1969 political disturbances and more importantly the
relinquishment of the nation's leadership by Tunku Abdul Rah~an in
September 1970, the idea of the neutralisation of Southeast Asia was
relegated to a political limbo.
From January 1968 until September 1970, Halaysian diplomatic
efforts aimed at working out a solution that would at least partially
ameliorate the security gap that would be created by the departure of
British armed forces from the region. Towards this end the Tunku had
proposed in 1967 during the London talks that Britain and the other
Commonwealth countries effected by the withdrawal decision hold talks
in Kuala Lumpur. Whitehall's reaction to this proposal was at the
beg' . h . t' 32~nn~ng, to say the least, unent us~as ~c. Kuala Lumpur's efforts
in this direction were renewed in early 1968 following the announcement
of the British plans for an accelerated withdrawal from the region. This
time Kuala Lumpur's efforts were more successful. It was announced at the
end of April that a Five Power Conference would be convened in Kuala Lumpur
in June 1968.
~'lhatfinally emerged from l'lalaysianefforts in the three years
from 1~68 to 1970 was the imperative need to have some form of a
Commonwealth military presence in the region, which would provide a
breather that could be used to generate a credible degree of indigenous
defence capability and the working out of a scheme for long term regional
security.
From an analysis of the avenues along which Malaysians
diPlomacy and political efforts were channelled towards creating alter-
native security arrangements the net result that materialised was the
Five Power Defence Arrangement between Malaysia, Singapore, Britain,
Australia and New Zealand. Concomitant to this was the acute realisation
of Malaysia of her defence weakness and the associated desire to build up
a credible defence capability as she was forced by the pace of events to
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take cognisance of the fact that in the last analysis she would have to
bear the burden of the country's defence. The prospect of a British
military disengagement from the region also led to fundamental rethinking
of the problem of regional security.
The signing of the Five Power Defence Arrangement was preceded
by long and arduous negotiation and bickering between the signatories.
The entire process was stretched over a period of approximately four
years. During this bargaining process three major conferences were held
in Kuala Lumpur in June 1968, in Canberra in June 1969, and in London in
April 1971. These five Power Summit meetings embodied the various
decisions on which the final Five Fower Defence Arrangement was built on.
On 1 November 1971 the Anglo Malaysian Defence Agreement was
replaced by the new Five Power Defence Arrangement.
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